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I’m not omniscient. Even if my beliefs are perfectly rational, they’re not perfectly accurate.
Given the limited information at my disposal, middling confidence may be a rationally impec-
cable attitude to have to the proposition the number of cats in the house is even. Yet if there are
in fact two cats in the house, the proposition is true and the maximally accurate attitude would
be full confidence. Or so asserts an influential characterization (Joyce’s) of the ‘accuracy’ of
partial beliefs.1
Nevertheless if I’m to claim to be perfectly rational, I better avoid gratuitous inaccuracy—
inaccuracy where my limited information is no excuse. If an agent has belief state b, and belief
state b′ is more accurate than b no matter what the world is like, then b is rationally flawed.
Flawless belief cannot be ‘accuracy dominated’. Or so Joyce supposes.
This normative assumption relating accuracy to rationality becomes a premise in an argu-
ment for probabilism when conjoined to the following theorem: that if one’s belief state fails to
be probabilistic, it will be gratuitously inaccurate in just the way flagged above.
This note examines the principles required for this argument to go through, and argues
that they motivate a (non-pragmatic) argument for Conditionalization as the rationally required
update-rule.2
Godlike belief
At the centre of this argument for probabilism is the comparative accuracy of belief states at
worlds. The notion is appealed to in the criterion for rationally flawed belief in the second para-
graph. Various assumptions about the features of this ‘inaccuracy score’ are required to prove
the theorem cited in the third paragraph. One candidate ‘accuracy scoring rule’ is the Brier
score, which tells us that the degree of inaccuracy of b at w is given by the square difference
between the truth value of a proposition at w and the degree of belief b invests in it, summed
over all propositions. Other scoring rules are available, but the differences won’t matter here.3
I want to flag one central feature of the Brier score (and indeed, all the other scoring rules
that I’ve seen). The ‘truth value’ of a proposition is represented by a numerical value—1 for
truth, 0 for falsity. That’s clearly crucial to making the proposal well-formed. One cannot
perform arithmetical manipulations on ‘the True’ or ‘the False’—only on numbers.4
∗Thanks to Kenny Easwaran, Paolo Santorio and Richard Pettigrew for discussion.
1(Joyce, 1998, 2009)
2Throughout, I will be confining attention to belief states over a finite set of worlds. For discussion of extensions
to the infinite case, see (Easwaran, 2013).
3The results which will be appealed to below go through for any accuracy measure meeting the conditions that
(Joyce, 1998) sets out. See (Williams, 2012b) for discussion of the required generalization.
4Stephan Hartman, for one, has questioned whether numerical representations of truth values can be justified.
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Where do the 1’s and 0’s come from? Well, there’s a belief state that one would ideally
adopt, given the information that w is actual. We’ll call that the ‘godlike’ credence to have at w.
Certainty in A is the godlike attitude to take to A when it is true; utter rejection is the godlike
attitude to take to A when it is false. We standardly represent degrees of belief on a scale
between 1 and 0, with 1 representing certainty and 0 rejection. So that’s where the numbers
come from—-they encode information about the godlike credences associated with truth and
falsity respectively. As a result, the distribution of truth values over propositions at world w
exactly coincides with the godlike credences to have at w.
(Association of 1 with truth and 0 with falsity is so widely entrenched that it’s easy to let
it pass by without comment, and imagine somehow it’s true by construction or convention. To
appreciate the need for some kind of bridge principle here, it’s helpful to imagine for a moment
worlds as Lewis (1986) did—maximal spatio-temporally unified chunks of concrete reality. No
function from propositions to numbers is intrinsic to worlds so construed! We can also see
that a bridge is needed by considering less familiar cases of the same phenomenon. If we have
three or more truth statuses to deal with—truth, falsity and ‘other’—then it’s more obviously
a nontrivial question what ‘truth value’ or ‘ideal opinion’ we should associate with the new
status.5)
Godlike credence is a normative notion—-it’s unpacked as the ideal belief state to have given
certain information. In contrast to the graded ‘degree of accuracy’ of an arbitrary belief state
at a given world, ideal belief (relative to some information) is absolute, all-or-nothing. You’re
either ideal or you’re not. The picture I want to encourage views the degree of (in)accuracy of
b at w as the upshot of two more fundamental facts. The first is that a certain bw is godlike at w,
i.e. that it is the correct belief-state to have, given the information that w is actual. The second
is b is such-and-such distance from bw.
Angelic belief
We will extend the notion of ideal belief, relative to given information. For any block of infor-
mation E, we can ask what one should ideally believe, given E as total evidence.
Now, perhaps the question as formulated at the moment doesn’t have a categorical answer.
Perhaps non-evidential factors—one’s attitude to epistemic risk; one’s ultimate priors; various
culturally entrenched norms, or whatever—deliver different answers. But I’ll assume that once
we hold fixed all such factors (collectively, call that a stance), there is a definite answer to what
one should ideally believe, given the evidence. For simplicity, I’ll drop explicit mention of the
relativization to stances from now on, but the whole discussion to follow will go through relative
to a fixed stance.
In the special case where E is complete—where is is the information that w is actual,
for some possible world w—then the ideal belief state has a familiar form (at least assum-
ing classicism)—a string of 1s and 0s matching truths and falsities respectively. But if E is less
specific, then it’s a matter for substantive epistemological debate what shape the ideal belief
state, given information E, should be. I’ll make no direct assumptions about what these ideal
belief states are. What I will do is outline certain normative roles that they play. As we’ll see,
indirectly, this constrains what sort of thing ideal belief can be.
Whereas ideal belief states relative to complete information are godlike, I’ll call the ideal
belief states relative to incomplete information angelic—still ideal, but lacking omniscience.
Recall our earlier gloss on the normative premise in the dominance argument for probabil-
ism:
5The last question is addressed in (Williams, 2012b, forthcoming)
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the rational agent avoids gratuitous inaccuracy—inaccuracy where our limited in-
formation is no excuse. If belief state b′ is more accurate than b no matter what the
world is like, then b is rationally flawed..
In the light of the discussion in the previous section, we should unpack this as follows:
the rational agent avoids gratuitous distance from the ideal belief state to have at
the actual world; that is, she avoids divergence from the ideal where her limited
information is no excuse. If belief state b′ is closer than b to the ideal beliefs
to have at the actual world no matter what the world is like, then b is rationally
flawed.
I propose we formulate the underlying principle as follows:
Suppose an agent’s total evidence (at a time) is E, and her belief state b. Let Γ
partition the worlds compatible with E. And let bγ be the ideal belief state to have
relative to total information γ, for each γ ∈ Γ. Then b is rationally flawed if there is
a b′ which is closer than b to each bγ.
The idea is that because Γ partitions the way that the world might be (relative to the ev-
idence possessed by the agent in question), we know that exactly one γ ∈ Γ is correct. And
consequently, exactly one bγ reports an ideal belief state relative to information at least as
strong as the total evidence the agent possesses. Limited information can excuse keeping one’s
doxastic distance from any single belief state associated with a cell in the partition; but being
unnecessarily far away from all of them simply guarantees that one is not as close as one could
be to the ideal beliefs one would have in a better-informed state.
Now, for the purposes of the original accuracy argument, we only need the instance of
this principle for a single, special partition of propositions—the partition of the worlds them-
selves. But if there’s something bad about gratuitously keeping one’s doxastic difference from
better-informed belief in that case, I can’t see why there wouldn’t be a similar complaint about
gratuitously keeping one’s doxastic distance from better-informed even if not fully informed be-
lief. So I’m going to endorse this principle in full generality, i.e. relative to an arbitrary partition
Γ of the E-worlds.
With that generalization in place, the die is cast—we can start drawing conclusions about
the shape of rational belief in general, and ideal belief in particular.
To begin with, we have the Joyce accuracy-domination theorem. Under suitable assump-
tions about the behaviour of the accuracy measure, one can prove the theorem that an improba-
bilistic belief state b (one which is not a convex combinations of godlike credences) is always
‘accuracy dominated’. We always find a belief state that is guaranteed to be closer to the god-
like credence at the actual world than b itself is. And applying the normative principle above in
ungeneralized form, relative to the partition of worlds, we conclude that improbabilistic beliefs
are rationally flawed.
Given the generalized version, an analogous result holds for other partitions. We can simi-
larly prove that any belief state b that is not a convex combinations of angelic credences (across
an arbitrary partition Γ), will always be accompanied by a belief state that is closer than b to
each ideal, angelic credence. Hence, the belief state is flawed.6
A special case of interest is the following. Take an agent with evidence E, and consider
the trivial partition of E—E itself. The angelic belief for that partition is simply bE—the ideal
6For this result, relative to the Brier score see (De Finetti, 1974; Williams, 2012a), and for other scoring rules,
see (Williams, 2012b).
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belief to have for total evidence E. An agent’s belief will be gratuitously far away from the
ideal, unless they coincide with bE itself. So rationally flawless beliefs must be always be the
ideal response to the total evidence available.
A corollary. Assuming that there are rationally flawless beliefs to have in a situation where
the agent has total information E, by the above two observations they must (a) be probabilistic;
and (b) be the ideal response to evidence E. It follows that the ideal response to any evidence
must also be probabilistic (else the demands placed on a rational belief state given evidence E
would be incompatible). I said earlier that we would not directly assume anything substantive
about the ideal beliefs to have given this or that evidence. And indeed, I did not assume from
the get-go that ideal beliefs were probabilistic; we instead derived this from the generalized
normative role we’ve given to them.
Update
So far we’ve being talking about ways of evaluating (categorical) credences. We now move to
consider rules for updating belief. I’ll assume that the agent’s doxastic state includes not only
an assignment of (categorical) degrees of belief to propositions, but also an update rule R.
What is an update rule? It is a rule (or function) that takes a belief state, and new evidence,
to a new belief state—one that has digested the new information. We expect the update rule
to be defined over all well-behaved belief states, though it’s no problem if it doesn’t tell us
what to do for crazy irrational starting points. And we expect it to be defined whenever we
gain an increment of evidence, though rules may be silent about cases of non-cumulative evi-
dential change, for example, those involving memory loss. An example is the familiar rule of
conditionalization—that for a given (probabilistic) b, and (increment of) new evidence E, we
should move to the belief state obtained by conditionalizing b on E in the familiar way. Con-
ditionalization illustrates both kinds of restriction mentioned above: as standardly interpreted it
isn’t defined for non-probabilistic starting states; nor for cases where we lose evidence rather
than accumulating it. This section will argue that an agent with flawless beliefs in the sense
spelled out above, must update by Conditionalization.
There is a constraint on an update rule implicit in the constraint of the last section (assum-
ing, as is plausible, that update preserves rational flawlessness). For suppose one starts with a
rationally flawless belief state b in a situation where one’s total evidence is E1. And suppose one
gets new evidence E (without losing any old) so that one’s total new evidence is E2 = E1∪E.
We already know one characterization of what a rationally flawless belief state must be like,
given the new information state our agent is in. It must be the angelic belief state, relative to E2.
The constraint that arises is that if the update rule R maps b to b+ given increment of evidence
E, and b is the angelic credence for some E1, then b+ must be the angelic credence relative to
E1∪E.
Godlike and angelic belief states now perform two normative functions. Synchronically,
they are the base from which we measure the divergence of a given categorical belief state from
the ideal—a ‘external’ evaluation that is applied to agents not in possession of the information
that characterizes the ideal (which world is actual, which cell of a partition obtains). Diachron-
ically, they impose a constraint on how we should update our beliefs. The diachronic constraint
looks pretty useless right now, given that we still haven’t got much information about what the
angelic belief states are. But I’ll argue below that the only update rule that meets the constraint
just articulated, is conditionalization.
The angelic domination result of the previous section tells us that, relative to a partition Γ,
an agent’s belief state b, if it is to be unflawed, must be a convex combination of the angelic
credences corresponding to members of that partition. Now suppose that the agent follows an
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update rule R that is normatively ok. A consequence: the angelic credences for information γ,
must coincide with R(b,γ), for each γ ∈ Γ. Putting the two sides together: if the agent’s current
belief state is unflawed and her update rule normatively ok, then her current categorical beliefs
have to be a convex combination of the belief states she would update to, upon learning γ, across
the various γ that are cells in the partition Γ.
Note what’s happened: the mention of angelic belief states drops out altogether, and we’re
left with an internal constraint between her current beliefs and the update rule she follows. The
constraint (modulo nuances of philosophical interpretation) is van Fraassen’s ‘general reflec-
tion’. All that’s left is to work out the details of what this constraint requires. As it turns out
(and here we may appeal to technical results that have been established elsewhere) an update
rule R meeting this condition must be conditionalization.7
Conclusion
Synchronic probabilism can be supported by accuracy-based arguments. But when we look
at the details, we see that the key principle turns on gratuitous divergence between the belief
state in question and other, ideal belief states. And this motivates a generalization of the basic
principle that drives the argument, to states that are ideal relative to partial information. The
extended principle enables us to argue for more than just probabilism, however. It establishes a
direct link between evidence and rational belief. And it enables us to argue we should update
by conditionalization. But this should be qualified in at least three ways.
First, the argument only covers cases over evidence change where no evidence is lost. I take
it that this is a qualification that fans of conditionalization need anyway, on pain of declaring
amnesia irrational.
Second, the argument does not tell us that conditionalization is always and everywhere the
appropriate way to update—even for agents who have probabilistic beliefs. What it tells us is
that if your update rule is not conditionalization, then either there’s something wrong with your
categorical degrees of belief, or the way you update. Which gets the blame in any given instance
is something the argument is silent about. But still: every unflawed doxastic state incorporates
conditionalization as its update rule.8
7Here’s a sketch of van Fraassen’s argument to this effect (van Fraassen, 1999). We have that an agents categor-
ical beliefs b are a convex combination of the updated beliefs relative to γi where the γi form a partition. So there are
λi such that b =∑iλiR(b,γi). We assume that the belief state R(b,γi) will be credence 1 in any proposition entailed
by γi (including γi itself); and it will be credence 0 in any γ j for i 6= j. After all, this is the belief state one moves to
after learning that γi, which is compatible with the other γ j. It follows that b(γk) =∑iλiδik = λk. Substituting back
in, we have that b = ∑i b(γi)R(b,γi)—i.e. one’s categorical beliefs are the expectation of posterior beliefs upon
learning the elements of the partition. But further, we know by the law of total probability that b(·)=∑i b(γi)b(·|γi).
R(b,γk) and b(·|γk) are both zero on every proposition incompatible with γk. So if they diverge, then they must di-
verge on some proposition entailed by γk. But for all such A, we have ∑i b(γi)R(b,γi)(A) = b(A) =∑i b(γi)b(A|γi).
Both sums are zero everywhere except at k, by the choice of A. And so we have b(γk)R(b,γk)(A) = b(γk)b(A|γk).
Cancelling the b(γk), this shows that we cannot have any such divergence. So the update must be by conditional-
ization.
Compare (Skyrms, 2006) and the diachronic dutch book argument in (Williams, 2012a). This note fulfills a
promise made in the last citation, to give a non-pragmatic argument for conditionalization, that parallels (and
exploits the same geometrical situation as) the pragmatic argument for conditionalization presented therein. The
geometrical character of the argument is especially nice, since it allows us to use this result in settings beyond that
of standard, classical probabilism. However, it’s crucial to note the role played in van Fraassen’s argument of the
assumption that R(b,γi)(γi) = 1. This is very plausible, initially. However, in some nonclassical settings, it may
fail for the notion of conditional probability required for the rest of the argument (see (Milne, 2008; Williams,
forthcoming)).
8It’s worth noting too that the argument is silent about certain cases that conditionalization traditionally covers.
Take a probabilistic belief state b, which is nevertheless desparately out of line with with the agent’s evidence (the
5
Ideal opinion J. Robert G. Williams
Third, there is the concession I made early on—that the ideal belief states the argument
appeals to may be relative to one’s ‘stance’ (for example, one’s most deep-rooted prejudices).
The argument goes through, provided we relativize all appeals to belief to the same underlying
stance. We get the result that holding a fixed stance, one should update by conditionalization.
But here we find a loophole in the argument for conditionalization. Non-conditionalization
updates may yet be rationally permissible, if the new information prompts a change of stance.
But that’s fine: stance-constant conditionalization is conditionalization enough for me.9
If successful, this argument supports a genuinely diachronic conclusion. It targets and eval-
uates an update rule directly. This contrasts with a more familiar way of linking conditional-
ization with accuracy evaluations—via the result that conditionalization maximizes expected
accuracy (cf. e.g. (Greaves & Wallace, 2006; Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b,a)). That line of ar-
gument seems at best to result in a rational requirement to plan to conditionalize. It doesn’t tell
us that we should actually conditionalize, once the information comes in; for plans we’ve made
in the past are not in general rationally binding on us now, if they were based on now-outdated
information.10
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